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WHEN TWO WORLDS COLLIDE:
EXAMINING THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S
REASONING IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF
CIVIL SETTLEMENTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS*

INTRODUCTION

This Note will examine the Second Circuit's reasoning
in a line of cases allowing civil settlements and negotiations

into evidence during a crnminal trial. Federal Rule of Evidence

408 generally bars the use of such evidence at trial. However,
the Rule does provide for certain exceptions where settlement
or settlement negotiations is allowed into evidence if offered for
some purpose other than to prove amount or liability' The
significance of Rule 408 is not in what it does say, but in what
it does not say The Rule does not specify whether it is
applicable to crnnminal proceedings, and this lack of clarity has
prompted litigation and confusion in many courts, including
the Second Circuit.
A hypothetical can illustrate how this seemingly minor
point can lead to a sigmicant problem for a defendant in a
criminal case. If an employee steals checks from his company
and deposits them in a bank, he may be committing fraud.2 But
often, when a supervisor learns that an employee is stealing
from the company, the employee is fired and the company will
seek reimbursement from the employee. Often, this happens
before any criminal charges are made or even before the FBI or
local law enforcement are aware that a crime has taken place.
At this point, the employee may get a lawyer because he risks
being sued by his former company A good lawyer may
©2001 Todd W. Blanche. All Rights Reserved.
1See generally FED. R. EVID. 408.
2 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344 (2000).
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recommend that the employee, if in fact he did steal from the
company, arrange a settlement agreement whereby the money
is paid back. However, the negotiations and the settlement
itself could be introduced by the government against the
employee at a later crnnminal trial, where the potential sanction
is prison. The prosecutor may introduce evidence of a
defendant's participation in a civil settlement and the
accompanying negotiations as compelling evidence of guilt,
suggesting to the jury that the defendant would not have
settled the civil claim if the defendant had not committed the
3
alleged crime.

The legislative and committee notes show that Rule 408
was enacted to encourage parties to settle by allowing
unobstructed negotiations without either party risking that the
proposed settlement could later be used as an adnnssion to an
alleged act.4 However, neither the text, nor the history of Rule
408 resolves whether the Rule applies to both criminal and
civil cases, or only to civil litigation. Apparently, the framers of
this Rule did not anticipate an example like the one above
when drafting Rule 408.
The distinction between the civil and criminal docket is
important because the Federal Rules of Evidence generally
apply to both civil and criminal proceedings. 5 Most other courts
and leading evidence treatises conclude that settlements and
negotiations should be protected under Rule 408 not only in
civil trials, but also in criminal proceedings. 6 Nearly all circuit
and state courts that have examined the issue have tended
toward a liberal reading of the Rule, erring on the side of

3 See United States v. Divuiey, 99 Cr. 871 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. July 17,
2000) (order denying defendantfs motion to set aside the guilty verdict in his criminal
trial); Transcript of Pre-Trial Conference at 16, United States v. Diviney, 99 Cr. 871
(AK-) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2000).
4 See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's notes; Leslie T. Gladstone,
Rule 408: Maintaining the Shield for Negotiations in Federal and Bankruptcy Courts,
16 PEPP. L. REV. 237, 238 (1989).
5 FED. R. EVID. 1101(b) ('[Federal Rules of Evidence] apply generally to civil
actions and proceedings .[and] to criminal cases and proceedings
").
6 See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 872 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Meadows, 598 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103 (8th
Cir. 1976); Ecklund v. United States, 159 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1947); United States v.
Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ohio 1997); State v. Gano, 988 P.2d 1153 (Haw. 1999).
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caution and a judicial policy that favors settlement. 7 Courts are
willing to endorse this policy by rejecting attempts by the
opposition to introduce evidence of settlements, despite the
various exceptions allowed by the Rule. 8 However, the Second
Circuit admits settlement evidence in criminal trials for a
number of public policy reasons that override the objectives
and goals of Rule 408 as applied to civil litigation. 9
The focus of this Note is whether the Second Circuit has
properly interpreted Rule 408 in finding that it does not apply
to criminal litigation. Two issues must be addressed to begin to
answer this question. The first is whether society's interest in
prosecuting crimes outweighs the judicial system's preference
to have private parties settle their disputes without going
through the complete litigious process of a court case. The
second is whether a court is at liberty to make this distinction
in light of the advisory committee's explanations for Rule 408
and the limitations courts are required to adhere to when
applying Congressional acts such as the Federal Rules of
Evidence.1 0
As this Note will show, the precedential cases before the
Second Circuit and other courts are not the types of cases that
make the' admissibility of settlements in criminal trials appear
harmful to society or the judicial system. Most of these
defendants were guilty, or likely so, and appear to be settling
7 See Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement
Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 964-65, 998 (1988) (citing cases that find the
policies that justify Rule 408 can be at odds with other public policies, sometimes
leading to a narrow interpretation of Rule 408). Brazil's article also gives weight to the
advisory committee's notes, leaving little question that Rule 408 was designed to
"encourage commumcation about a broad range of settlement-related matters, not just
about offers or demands." Id. at 998.
8 FED. R. EVID. 408 CThis Rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise
negotiations. This Rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for
another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution.").
9 See, e.g., United States v. Recalde, 172 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1999); Manko v.

United States, 87 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Baker, 926 F.2d 179 (2d Cir.
1991); United States v. Gonzalez, 748 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1984). The Seventh Circuit also
concurs with the Second Circuit. See United States v. Prewitt, 34 F.3d 436 (7th Cir.
1994). See also State v. Szawronski, 665 A.2d 1156 (N.J. 1995).
1o See generally Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (holding that

courts are not permitted to substitute their own policy objectives for those of Congress).

BROOKLYN LAWREVEW

[Vol. 67: 2

because they were wrong. However, there are certainly
situations where a company or individual will settle a dispute
for reasons other than guilt, such as to avoid litigation costs
and stress, or, simply, to make peace. It will be interesting to
see how the Second Circuit applies its holdings to these types
of situations.
This Note will first detail the parameters and
application of Rule 408 to criminal proceedings by examining
the legislative history and reasomng behind Rule 408. Next,
this Note will examine Second Circuit cases that establish the
precedent circuit holding that Rule 408 does not apply to
criminal litigation. A sub-section of this Part will discuss two
recent cases tried in the Southern District of New York where
this issue was raised. Finally, this Note will briefly study other
circuit, district, and state courts that follow a more protective
policy toward settlements and hold that Rule 408 applies to
both civil and criminal proceedings. The conclusion reasons
that the Second Circuit has improperly interpreted Rule 408 by
allowing settlements and settlement negotiations into evidence
of a criminal trial. The conclusory result reached by the Second
Circuit that public policy favors prosecuting crimes over
settling claims may be correct. However, the means to achieve
this result should come from the legislature, not from judicial
interpretation of an ambiguous federal rule. Until the advisory
committee amends Rule 408, the Second Circuit should
recognize the extreme prejudicial effect evidence of a
settlement will have on a jury weighing criminal charges
against a defendant and thus find it inadmissible.

I.

POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RULE 408 VERSUS THE
GOALS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The primary distinction courts draw upon in deciding
whether or not to apply Rule 408 to criminal proceedings is
rooted in the differing policy goals of civil litigation and the
criminal justice system. On the one hand, since common law,
our judicial system encourages parties to settle their disputes.
On the other hand, the criminal justice system is responsible to
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the public to enforce the law Rule 408 is an example of the
complexities that can arise when balancing the goals of civil
litigation with those of the crimnal docket."
This section of the Note will first examine the policy
reasons behind Rule 408 and discuss how various evidence
treatises have explained this Rule. Next, this section will
address the various interpretations courts have applied to this
Rule and how scholars view these interpretations.
A.

Policy Justificationsfor Rule 408

While the text of Rule 408 does not expressly state
whether it applies to criminal litigation, the advisory
committee, along with the Congressional reports, did detail the
necessity for this Rule and the reasoning behind it. Although
differing
this commentary was vague and created
interpretations of the Rule, it does shed light on the
justification for this Rule.
Rule 408 states that settlements are "not admissible to
prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.
Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible."1 2 The advisory
committee noted two reasons for this Rule. First, settlement
evidence is irrelevant for evidentiary purposes because one
party may offer to settle as a peaceful gesture, not out of
"weakness."' 3 The desire for peace is often one motivation for
" See Tannuzzo v. Johnson, 1996 WL 1057169 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1996);
Manko, 87 F.3d at 54.
12 FED. R. EVID. 408. The complete Rule follows:

Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration

in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was
disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove

liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not

admissible. This Rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations. This Rule also does not require exclusion
when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias
or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Id.

13 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
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settlement, but one must be realistic when using this as a
justification for excluding evidence of a settlement. As the
advisory committee notes in the sentence following this reason,
the size of the settlement compared to the amount asked for by
the plaintiff influences the validity of this position. 14 For
instance, if a plaintiff seeks $10,000 and settles for $8,000, one
can argue that the defendant at least recogmzes the legitimacy
of the claim, even if this is not an outright admission of guilt.
The advisory committee's second reason for Rule 408 is
to encourage parties to settle. 15 Judges, lawyers, and
commentators throughout the legal commumty agree that an
aggressive policy toward settlement is a necessity 16
Empanelling a jury is expensive and exhausts resources, not to
mention the money both sides are forced to spend on lawyers
and trial preparation. The system will collapse if settlements
and plea agreements do not end litigation long before trial in
the majority of both civil and criminal litigation. 17 Although
most cases today are resolved in some way other than a trial,
the American judicial system is still clogged with both civil and
criminal cases.' 8 So the judicial system has a practical reason
for doing everything possible to encourage parties to settle. To

14 Id.
15 Id. ("A more consistently inpressive ground is promotion of the public
policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes.").
16 Bank of Am. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 349, 350 (3d Cir.
1986); but see Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984)
(arguing that settlement is not always preferable to judgment).
17 See generally Bank of Am., 800 F.2d at 345; Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d
1072, 1074 (5th Cir. 1976) ('With today's burgeoning dockets and the absolute
impossibility of Courts ever beginning to think that they might even be able to hear
every case, the cause of justice is advanced by settlement compromises sheparded by
competent counsel, whose experience as advocates makes them reliable predictors of
litigation were it pursued to the bitter end.").
is See Marc Galenter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 27-28 (1983); Philip J. Harter, Neither Cop Nor Collection
Agent. EncouragingAdministrative Settlements by EnsuringMediator Confidentiality,
41 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 316 (1989) (stating that ninety-five percent of the
Environmental Protection Agency's enforcement suits settle, which is close to the
percentage of federal cases that are disposed of before trial). One study found that of
all the cases that become lawsuits, only nine percent go to trial. Bank of Am., 800 F.2d
at 344.
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foster settlement, the judicial system has changed structurally
by giving judges more leeway in encouraging parties to settle. 19
As settlements become more common in our judicial
system, it is important to keep in mind that the idea of
resolving disputes by means other than a trial is often at odds
with the goals of the criminal justice system. Enforcing the
laws of the state by prosecuting individuals or entities that
have violated these laws, while ensuring fair treatment and
due process for the accused, does not fit into a discussion about
getting parties out of the system by peaceful compromise.
Although judicial efficiency and economy play a role in the
criminal justice system, many argue these necessities should
take a back seat to fairness, equality, and the enforcement of
20
the laws of the state.
A concerted effort has also been made to ease the
burden on criminal courts. State sentencing structures and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines 2 1 give criminal defendants
credit for pleading guilty by giving them more lement
sentences. The main reason for this is allocation of resources.
By accepting responsibility for a crime and pleading guilty at
an early stage of the litigation process, a defendant saves the
judicial system money and resources. A judge still has some
discretion in determining a sentence, and it makes sense that a
judge is more likely to be lement on a defendant who admits
guilt and saves the judicial system time and resources than a
defendant who invokes his constitutional right to a trial and is
convicted.
Some commentators and judges give other justifications
for Rule 408. For instance, settlements do not necessarily
include an admission of guilt. There are a number of reasons
19 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 16 now gives a judge more power
in encouraging settlement. In addition, encouraging settlement is now an explicit

purpose of
a pre-trial conference. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(a)(5).
20
See generallyManko, 87 F.3d at 54 ("The policy favoring the encouragement
of civil settlements, sufficient to bar their admission in civil actions, is insufficient, in
our view, to outweigh the need for accurate determinations in criminal cases where the
stakes are igher.").
2i The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were established in 1984 but not
applied until 1987. The Guidelines deduct "points" from a defendants sentence range
for "acceptance of responsibility" when a defendant pleads guilty. Even more credit is
given to a defendant who pleads guilty early on in his litigation. See generally U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELNES MANUAL § 2FI.I (2000).
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for an individual to choose settlement over a public trial. 22 The
advisory committee's point that an offer is not an admission is
often cited as a justification for the Rule. 23 In addition,
statements made during settlement negotiations are not
necessarily stated for the veracity or truthfulness of them, but
rather are offered by one party to encourage the other party to
24
settle.
B.

The Courts'Attempt to Reconcile the ContrastingGoals
of Rule 408 and the Criminal Justice S~stem

Obviously, this is not the only tne the criminal justice
system conflicts with other policy interests, leaving judges and
policymakers with the unwelcome task of deciding which
interests should be given priority Different courts have
reached different conclusions regarding Rule 408. The Second
Circuit opines that the public interest in "disclosure and
prosecution of crime" is greater than the public interest in
encouraging settlement.2 5 Other courts and commentators
disagree, finding that an individual should not be given the
privilege of protection in one forum, only to have the veil lifted
because the docket is criminal rather than civil.2 6 As one
district court noted, even if the policy justifications for Rule

408 are more aptly applied to civil proceedings than criminal, it
does not follow that settlements derived from a civil context
22 See Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 603 F Supp. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(finding that settlement negotiations were intended to "avoid the litigation of a
potentially costly and complex suie').
23 2 MCCORMICK ON EVID. § 266 (John W. Strond ed., 5th ed. 1999).
McCormick emphasizes that the importance placed on the settlement often depends on
the amount of the settlement. "[A] very small offer of payment to settle a very large
claim being much more readily construed as a desire for peace rather than an
admission of weakness of position. Relevancy would increase, however, as the amount
of the offer approaches the amount claimed." Id., see also supra notes 14, 15 and
accompanying text.
24 From an eidentiary standpoint, this is true. However this may be one
reason not to protect the information, because by protecting this information from
disclosure at trial, parties know they do not have to be entirely truthful or forthcoming
in settlements because assertions made can not be introduced at trial. See Olin, 603 F
Supp. at 450.
25 Gonzalez, 748 F.2d at 78.
26 See Gladstone, supra note 4, at 239 (discussing the fact that Rule 408 may
in fact be a privilege).
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lose their protection when raised in a criminal proceeding.27
The decisions of these courts will be scrutinized in later
sections of this Note; but with these ideas in mind,it is helpful
to examine another Federal Rule of Evidence that seeks to
accomplish similar goals as Rule 408 by protecting plea
negotiations and agreements in criminal cases.
Federal Rule of Evidence 41028 was enacted to permit
"unrestricted candor" in plea discussions by excluding offers to
plead guilty from evidence. 29 Although Rule 410 is similar to
Rule 408 in many respects, an important distinction is that
Rule 410 specifically states that it applies in both civil and
criminal proceedings. 3 0 Both rules emphasize the importance of
the forum in which the negotiation takes place, whether it be a
plea agreement or a settlement. 31 The context in which the
negotiation is to be admitted at trial is not the determining
factor for a court to consider, but rather the forum in which the
original negotiation took place.3 2 For instance, an admission
made by a defendant to a law enforcement agent is not
protected even if the defendant thinks they are engaging in
plea negotiations. Rule 410 specffically states that only plearelated discussions made directly to a government attorney are
protected, not discussions with other members of law
enforcement. 33 On the other hand, Rule 408 only applies when
the parties are engaging in settlement negotiations, although it
is more liberal in that it does not matter to whom the
settlement negotiations are presented. As long as the
discussion occurs in the course of civil litigation or potential
litigation, Rule 408 precludes their admission at a later trial,
27

Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. at 256-57.
FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's note.
29 See generallyFED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's note. Federal Rule of
28

Evidence 410 corresponds to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6). Rule 410 is
titled The Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related
Statements, and declares inadmissible a guilty plea which is later withdrawn, a plea of
holo contender, statements made in any Rule 11 procedure or similar state procedure,
and statements made in the course of plea discussions with a government attorney,
which do not result in a plea of guilty. The Rule also explicitly states that this evidence
is inadmissible "in any civil or criminal proceeding." FED. R. EVID. 410.
30 Id. C'in any civil or criminal proceeding [evidence of guilty pleas is
not] admissible).
31 Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. at 256-57.
32 Id.
33
Id.at 254; see also FED. R. EVID. 410.
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or at least in a later civil trial.3 4 Nevertheless, the actual forum
in which the discussion takes place is operative to the
application of both Rule 408 and 410. Why the drafters
included in Rule 410 its applicability to both civil and criminal
trials and did not put that language in Rule 408 is open to
debate. This omission in Rule 408 is considered by some judges
and commentators to be determinative that the drafters
intended the Rule to apply to both civil and criminal cases.8 5
Others follow the Second Circuit and use this omission to
bolster its interpretation that the authors intended Rule 408 to
36
apply only to civil cases.
One district court in the Second Circuit recogmzed that

Rule 408 "does not demand a reflective or mechamstic
approach; rather, in deciding whether to admit evidence of
settlement negotiations for a purpose other than to prove or
disprove liability, the trial judge 'should weigh the need for
such evidence against the potentiality of discouraging future
settlement negotiations."'3 7 Prior to that trial, the judge
excluded the evidence about a handshake agreement entered
into by the parties, but during the trial, he reversed himself
because of testimony elicited by the plaintiffs on direct
examination.3 8 Balancing the different equities and issues of
34

Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. at 257.
35 Id. ("the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence were aware of the scope
and breadth of the rules and that these rules would be applied m criminal cases.");
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Diviney's Motion In Limne to Exclude
Evidence of a Civil Settlement at 8, United States v. Diviney, 99 Cr. 871 (AKI1)
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) ([i]t
is apparent that, when the drafters wanted to limit the
application of Rule 408 under certain circumstances, they did so. Likewise, when the
drafters wanted to limit the application of one of the rules to civil cases or to criminal
cases, they did so explicitly. The drafters' failure to limit Rule 408 to civil cases is
incontrovertible evidence that the rule precluding evidence of settlements and
settlement offers is equally applicable to criminal cases such as this one.").
36 See Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Post-Tral
Motion of Defendant at 27 n.3, Diviney, 99 Cr. 871 (AKH) (July 12, 2000) ("Rule 408's
inapplicability to criminal cases is confirmed by comparing -that Rule to Rule 410,
which
explicitly prohibits pleas, plea discussions, and related statements 'in any
civil or criminal proceeding"); Chicago v. EnvtL Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338
(1994) C"[I]t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely'
when it 'includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another."') (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993).
37 Tannuzzo v. Johnson, 1996 WL 1057169 at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1996)
(quoting Trebor Sportswear Co. v. The Limited Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 510-11 (2d
Cir. 1989)).
38 Id. at *6, *7.
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this Rule is difficult, even more so when the stakes are raised
in the crininal setting.
C.

The Second Circuit'sInterpretatinof Rule 408

Second Circuit opinons interpret Rule 408 to only apply
to civil proceedings for reasons based on both the text of the
Rule and policy considerations. The Second Circuit has relied
on three assumptions. First, "[t]he public interest in the
disclosure and prosecution of crime" is "greater than the public
interest in the settlement of civil disputes."3 9 Second, the
wording of Rule 408 indicates that the Rule aptly applies to
civil proceedings, not criminal. 40 Finally, a comparison to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure l1(e)(6), which excludes
plea negotiations from criminal or civil trials to Rule 408,
shows that the very existence of this criminal Rule "strongly
supports the conclusion that Rule 408 applies only to civil
41
matters."
However, the Second Circuit's reasoning is open to
dispute. For example, the last sentence of Rule 408 states that
the Rule "does not require exclusion when the evidence is
an effort to
offered for another purpose, such as proving
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution." 42
Commentators and others have questioned why this exception
for obstruction of justice would be necessaryif Rule 408 did not
apply to criminal cases. 3 Commentators and one court have
noted that Rule 408 also protects the government in criminal
cases where a defendant seeks to offer testimony about offers

39 Gonzalez, 748 F.2d at 78.
40 Manko, 87 F.3d at 54; United States v. Baker, 926 F.2d 179, 180 (2d Cir.
1991).

41
42

Baker, 926 F.2d at 180.

FED. R. EVID. 408.
43 29 AM. JUR. 2D EVID. § 512 (1994) (citing LOUISELL & MUELLER, FEDERAL

EVIDENCE § 170 (1978)); Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Diviney's
Motion In Lnme to Exclude Evidence of a Civil Settlement at 7, 99 Cr. 871 (AKH) ('if
Rule 408 did not apply in criminal cases, there would be no need to carve out an
exception for certain circumstances in criminal cases.") (quoting United States v.
Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. 254, 257 (N.D. Ohio 1997)).
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made by the government during plea negotiations. 44 Rule 410,
which protects a defendant from the government admitting
plea agreements that were later withdrawn and plea
negotiations made to a government attorney, does not protect
the government from the defendant introducing the same
evidence. 45 To the extent that courts rule that statements and
plea offers made by the government during plea negotiations
are not admissible, they rely on Rule 408, and conclusively,
46
apply the Rule to criminal trials.
Still another treatise singles out the Second Circuit's
Gonzalez decision as having an adverse effect on the goals of
Rule 408. 47 In a footnote, the author states,
The decision may have unfortunate consequences. A target of a
potential criminal investigation may be unwilling to settle civil
claims against him if by doing so he increases the risk of prosecution
and conviction. If widely followed, Gonzalez could make it much
more difficult for the victims of questionable conduct to obtain timely
compensation for what they have lost.48

Even before Rule 408 went into effect, federal courts
held that proposed settlements or accepted compromises could
not be admitted as evidence of an admission of the validity or
invalidity of a crime. 49 The justice system recognized the
importance and value of protecting the arena of settlements
44 United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that
under Rule 408, government plea offers should be excluded); MUELLER &KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 4.25, at 347 (2d ed. 1999).

45 See generally FED. R. EVID. 410; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 44,

§ 4.25, at 347; see also sources cited supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
46 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 43, § 170; see Trial Transcript at 84-87,
United States v. Ortega, 00 Cr. 432 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2001) (denying
defendant's application to admit evidence about plea negotiations); but see United
States v. Biaggi 909 F.2d 662, 690 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that the district court abused
its discretion and demed the defendant a fair trial by excluding evidence of immunity
negotiations where defendant refused to testify against others and demed any wrong
doing).
47 FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 22:16 (7th ed. 2000).

48 Id. at 119 n.83.
49 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 408.031] at 10 n.1 (2d ed. 2001) (citing

West v. Smith, 101 U.S. 263 (1879) (mere offer of compromise cannot prejudice rights
of plaintiff); Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore Warehouse Co., 93 U.S. 527, 548 (1876) (offer
of compromise by defendant's agent not admissible); Ins. Cos. v. Weldes, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 375, 381 (1872) ('[a] compromise proposed or accepted is not evidence of an
admission of the amount of the debt").
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long before Rule 408. As one attorney recently argued in
federal court in the Southern District of New York, "[lit is hard
to imagine a situation where a party accused of wrongdoing
would agree to a civil settlement requiring the payment of
money if the party knows that his entering into a settlement
could be used against him in a later criminal prosecution." 50
Modern policy also favors private dispositions, as evidenced by
some state statutes that authorize private settlement of a
misdemeanor if a civil remedy for the victim is available. 51
Some commentators apply Rule 408 to both civil and
criminal proceedings without debate. Wright and Miller's
Federal Practice and Procedure on Evidence says that "Rule
408 would make covered compromise evidence inadmissible in
criminal as well as civil proceedings." 52 Addressing whether
Rule 408 bars the use of evidence of civil compromise
negotiations in a criminal prosecution, the treatise answers
"clearly 'yes."'53 Another states that "[i]f the transaction on
which the prosecution is based also gives rise to a civil cause of
action, a compronse or offer of compromise to the civil claim
should be privileged when offered at the criminal trial if no
54
agreement to stifle the criminal prosecution was involved."
II.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT OPINIONS AND RuLE 408

This section examines the Second Circuit cases that
establish the precedent that Rule 408 only applies to civil
litigation. The three cases are United States v. Gonzalez,5 5
57
United States v. Baker,56 and Manko v. United States.
The second part of this section is a case study of two
recent trials in the Southern District of New York. In both
50

Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Diviney's Motion In Liune
to Exclude Evidence of a Civil Settlement at 10, United States v. Diviney, 99 Cr. 871
(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000).
51 OR. REV. STAT. § 135.703 (1999); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 44,
138, at 104 (suggesting that when a state law would protect a settlement
arrangement, then Rule 408 should protect that in federal court).
52 23 WRIGHT & MILLER, FED. PRAC. AND PROC. EVID. § 5308 (2000 Supp.).
53 Id.
54 MCCORMICK, supranote 23, § 266.
55 748 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1984).
56 926 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1991).
57 87 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1996).

§
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cases, the district court allowed evidence of settlements and
settlement negotiations into evidence at trial. The cases,
United States v. Recalde58 and United States v. Dwviney, 59
resulted in convictions that were either affirmed or not
appealed. One gets a sense that the predictions made by many
of the commentators regarding the potency of this evidence
have practical truths. Evidence of compromise, in both of these
cases, was damaging to the defendant and certainly should
give pause to readers, no matter on which side of the issue they
fall.
A.

United States v. Gonzalez

The precedential Second Circuit case on the application
of Rule 408 to the criminal docket is United States v.
Gonzalez.60 The court held that policy considerations behind
Rule 408 do not apply to excluding settlement offers in
criminal cases. The defendant in Gonzalez was charged and
convicted of wire fraud and mail fraud in connection with his
solicitation of a loan from a Spanish bank. The trial court
allowed testimony from an attorney for the bank that the
defendant admitted his knowledge of the existence of false and
forged documents. The trial judge also allowed into evidence a
confession of judgment executed by the defendant, It stated
that the defendant was "personally liable for the full amount of
61
the debt owing to [the Spanish bank]."
The Gonzalez court gave two reasons why the trial court
correctly allowed the testimony and documents surrounding
the defendant's settlement and negotiations. 62 First, evidence
was offered for an excepted purpose under Rule 408.63 Because
the evidence was offered to establish that the defendant
committed a crime, whether the bank had a valid civil claim
against the defendant was simply not relevant to reaching that
conclusion. 64 The court also gave a policy justffication for Rule
58 96 Cr. 057 (KMW).

59 99 Cr. 871 (AIKH).
60 748 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1984).
61 Id. at 77.
62
Id.
63 Id. at 78.
64

Id.
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408. The court stated that the premise of Rule 408 is that
"encouraging settlement of civil claims justifies excluding
otherwise probative evidence from civil lawsuits."6 5 However,
the court cautioned that "encouraging settlement does not
justify excluding probative and otherwise adnnssible evidence
in crininal prosecutions."66 The court reasoned,
The public interest in the disclosure and prosecution of crime is
surely greater than the public interest in the settlement of civil
disputes. It follows that since nothing in the Rule specifically
prohibits receiving in evidence the admissions and statements made
private parties, they are
at a conference to settle claims of
67
admissible in any criminal proceeding.

The Second Circuit correctly distinguishes between the
differing policy approaches involved n Rule 408. The justice
system has a big incentive to encourage parties to settle, thus
avoiding the laborious

lawsuit process.

68

However,

this

reasomng by the Gonzalez court is confusing because the court
first suggests that Rule 408 does apply to this criminal case,
but nonetheless allows the evidence in under an exception to
the Rule. 69 Moreover, the next paragraph states that "the
primary policy justification for Rule 408's exclusion in the civil
context does not apply to crinnal prosecutions." 70 The court
finds that since nothing in Rule 408 "specifically prohibits
receiving in evidence the admissions and statements made at a
conference to settle claims of private parties, they are
71
admissible in any crmnal proceeding."
The Gonzalez court does not rest its holding on the
legislative history of Rule 408. While the intent of the advisory
committee is clear, the notes and legislative history do not
state specifically the forum in which Rule 408 applies. The
Gonzalez court does cite the advisory committee notes
explaining the policy reasons for the Rule as they apply to civil

65

Gonzalez, 748 F.2d at 78.

66 Id.
67

Id.

68 See generallysupra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.

69 Gonzalez, 748 F.2d at 78.
70

Id.

71 Id.
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claims. 7 2 Aside from this, however, the court gives only brief
and conclusory policy reasons as to why Rule 408 should not
apply to criminal prosecutions. The broad statement the court
makes is that "[t]he public interest in the disclosure and
prosecution of crime is surely greaterthan the public interest in
the settlement of civil disputes." 73 The court cites no
Congressional finding to support this proposition. This
reasoning may also be contrary to a recent Supreme Court case
which curbs the judiciary from choosing its own policy
considerations over that of Congress.7 4 To the extent that the
statement may be true, there are many limitations put on a
prosecution regarding evidence that impedes on the "public
interest in the disclosure and prosecution of crime."75 The
Supreme Court recently recogmzed that even if a guilty
defendant goes free in some circumstances, some wellgrounded policies are necessary 76 Certainly, the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine concedes that evidence gained from
77
illegal means is generally not admissible.
The Gonzalez court cites no cases to support its holding,
nor does the court discuss in any detail the reasoning behind
its holding beyond the policy statement that the justification
for Rule 408's exclusion in the civil context does not apply to
78
criminal prosecutions.

72
Id.
73 Id. (emphasis added).
74 See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408 (holding that the language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 permitted no exception for an "exculpatory no," and stating that "[c]ourts may
not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how alluring the policy
arguments for doing so
").
75 Gonzalez, 748 F.2d at 78.
76 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431 (2000) (discussing Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
77 Mark S. Bransdorfer, MirandaRight-To-Counsel Violations and the Fruitof
the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 62 IND. L.J. 1061, 1064 (1987).
78 Gonzalez, 748 F.2d at 78.
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United States v. Baker

The Second Circuit revisited this issue in United States
v. Baker 9 and once again held that Rule 408 only applies to
civil litigation.80 The defendant was convicted for possessing
stolen electromc equipment. When federal agents went to the
defendant's house, the defendant showed them to the basement
where the stolen merchandise was stored, and asked the
agents if they knew of another agent who "made deals for other
people in the past."8 1 The defendant asked the agent that was
present if she would speak with the other agent so they could
"get together and make some sort of deal for myself."82 At trial,
the defendant sought to have these statements precluded
under Rule 408.83 The district court admitted the statements
and the defendant was convicted. The Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision not to suppress the statements.
Although this decision came seven years after Gonzalez,
the Second Circuit did not cite Gonzalez or use its reasoning.
Rather, the court relied on two entirely different principles.
The court first discussed the text of the Rule itself, which
emphasizes "a claim which was disputed as to validity or
amount."84 This language, according to the Second Circuit, is
only applicable to civil proceedings, since disputed claims
dealing with validity and amount normally only refer to civil
proceedings. 85 This is a good example of the confusing nature of
this Rule. This question would be resolved if the drafters of
Rule 408 simply stated their intention explicitly in the Rule or
in the advisory committee's notes. 86
79 926 F.2d 179 (2d Cir.

80 Id. at 180.
81

82
83

1991).

Id.
Id.
Id.

84FED. R. EVID. 408 (emphasis added); see also Baker, 926 F.2d at 180;
Governments Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Post-Trial Motion of
Defendant Earl Diviney, United States v. Diviney, 99 Cr. 871 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. July 12,
2000) C'the words employed by the drafters-e.g., 'liability,' 'claim' and 'amountf-make
it clear that
Rule 408 was intended to apply strictly to civil proceedings").
85
Baker, 926 F.2d at 180.
86 Many Federal Rules of Evidence do state that they apply to either criminal
or civil proceedings, or both. See FED. R. EVID. 301, 302, 404(a)(1), 413, 414, 714(b); see
also FED. R. EVID. 1101(b) (providing that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to both
civil and criminal actions).
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This text-based conclusion does not take into account
the numerous situations where the amount and validity of the
claim is the crux of criminal plea negotiations. For example,
the actual amount of loss is very important in determining a
sentence for a fraud conviction.87 Fraud loss in a criminal case
is the amount of proceeds the government alleges an accused
either received or attempted to receive by committing the
crime. If a defendant is accused of attempting to deposit a
counterfeit check for $10,000, but is only able to withdraw $100
before the authorities freeze the account, the fraud loss amount
is still $10,000, even though the defendant only personally
benefited $100. Because of this, when a defendant engages in
plea discussions with the government, the amount of fraud loss
the government intends to charge is always an issue. Often a
defendant chooses to go to trial because the amount of fraud
loss claimed by the government is too great and will result in a
sentence that is longer or harsher than what the defendant is
willing to accept.
In addition, the difference between a felony and a
misdemeanor is often determined by the amount of loss "agreed
to" in a plea agreement. 88 The Second Circuit's reasoning does
not reflect how plea negotiations work in conjunction with the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.8 9 In many situations, the
amount agreed to by the prosecution and the defendant as the
fraud loss amount will determine whether the defendant will
plead guilty or choose to go to trial. Even though the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the wording of Rule 408 is true for
87 See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 2F1.1. The
Sentencing Guidelines, for fraud and deceit cases, give a base level of six points, and
then add up to eighteen points for the fraud loss amount. So a defendant who has no
criminal history faces anywhere from zero to six months in jail at the lowest level to
fifty-one to sixty-three months at the higher level, depending on the fraud loss amount.
Id. See also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Kohison, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223
(1993).
88 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 101.
89 See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities:
An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 502-03 (1992) (discussing the inherent
unfair discretion that prosecutors have in determining sentences, and finding that
although the U. S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual is supposed to reduce disparity in
federal sentencing, it only limits the courts and the judges, not the prosecutors, in
discretional decisions during plea negotiations).

20011

CIVIL SETTLEMENTS AS EVIDENCE

most common law crimes, it cannot be accurately stated that
"disputed claims" only apply to civil proceedings. 90
The second reason the Baker court provided is the result
of a .comparison of Rule 408 to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure ll(e)(6).91 Under Rule ll(e)(6) the government
cannot introduce at trial evidence of plea negotiations that do
not result in guilty pleas and other admissions or facts that
suggest a defendant is guilty The court stated that "[t]he very
existence of [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] ll(e)(6)
strongly supports the conclusion that Rule 408 applies only to
civil matters."92 Rule ll(e)(6) explicitly states that it applies to
both civil and criminal proceedings, removing any ambiguity as
to whether a civil plaintiff could introduce evidence such as
93
plea negotiations with a government attorney in a civil trial.
The court's analysis is interesting, but unpersuasive, because it
does not explore why Congress passed these two Rules, and
what relationship they should have with each other.
The court opined that the existence of Rule 11(e)(6)
supported its view that Rule 408 only applies to civil
proceedings, but the court did not address the commonly held
view that Rule ll(e)(6) only protects the defendant from the
government introducing statements made during plea
discussions. The Rule does not protect the prosecution from the
defendant introducing government offers made to the
defendant during plea discussions. 94 A court is endorsing,
either intentionally or by default, the applicability of Rule 408
in criminal proceedings when it refuses to allow the defendant
to introduce offers made by the government during plea
discussions. 95 As the Eighth Circuit stated in United States v.
Verdoorn,96 "[m]eamngful dialogue between the parties would,
90

See generallyFED. R. EVID. 408.
91 Baker, 926 F.2d at 180; see supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text;
FED. R. EVID. 410.
see generally
92
Baker, 926 F.2d at 180.
93 See generallyFED. R. CRIM. P 11(e)(6).
94
See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
95

Id.

96 528 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the trial judge properly refused to

permit the defendants to put into evidence at their trial the fact that the prosecution
had entered into plea negotiations with them). This recently was also an issue during a
trial in the Southern District of New York. The defendant asked to introduce the fact
that he had refused a five year offer from the prosecution, even though he more than
doubled his time in jail if he went to trial and was convicted. The trial judge refused to
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as a practical matter, be impossible if either party had to
assume the risk that plea offers would be admissible in
97
evidence."
C.

Manko v. United States

The Second Circuit recently re-affirmed its position in
Manko v. Unzted States.98 The defendant was convicted of tax
fraud related to interest expense deductions arising from sham
transactions. In this case, it was the defendant who sought to
introduce evidence that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
and the defendant had settled civil tax claims that were based
on the same facts and theory as the criminal charges. This
evidence, the defendant claimed, was an admission by the IRS
that the defendant was at least partially justified in deducting
the losses that were claimed to be fraudulent in the criminal
trial. However, the trial judge did not let the defendant present
this evidence, in part because the judge rendered it
inadmissible under Rule 408. The Second Circuit concluded
that the district court erred by excluding the IRS settlement
under Rule 408, holding again that Rule 408 does not apply to
criminal proceedings. 99
The Second Circuit decision gives a detailed justification
why Rule 408 does not apply to the criminal docket. The
Manko court explicitly stated that it was balancing the policy
goals of the criminal and civil justice systems to determine
whether Rule 408 should apply to criminal proceedings: "The
policy favoring the encouragement of civil settlements,
sufficient to bar their admission in civil actions, is insufficient,
in our view, to outweigh the need for accurate determinations
in criminal cases where the stakes are higher."10 0

admit this evidence, citing the unfairness to the prosecution because they are not
allowed to introduce the evidence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6).
See Trial Transcript at 84-87, United States v. Ortega, 00 Cr. 432 (DLC), (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 23, 2001) (denying, under Rule 403, defendanes application to elicit testimony
that the defendant rejected a five year offer by the government).
97 Verdoorn, 528 F.2d at 107.
98 87 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1996).
99 Id. at 52, 55.
100 Id. at 54.
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The court also specifically overruled a decision that predates
the enactment
of Rule 408, United States v.
0
o
Ecklund,' and reaffirmed Gonzalez by holding that the
underlying policy considerations of Rule 408 are inapplicable in
1 02
criminal cases.
The Manko court noted that based on the advisory
committee's notes the primary purpose of Rule 408 is to
promote "compromise and settlement of disputes."1 03 The court
added that this policy "does not apply" to the criminal
docket.104 The court held that the probative value of this
evidence in a criminal trial outweighs the policy considerations
of excluding this evidence under Rule 408.
1. The Conflict Between Manko's Reasoning and
Congressional Intent
The reasoning of the Manko court may be absolutely
correct and in line with what society expects from its judicial
system. However, a recent Supreme Court decision affirmed
that courts are not allowed to substitute their own policy
reasons for that of Congress. 10 5 The Manko court seemingly did
just that by determining that the policy considerations of Rule
408 do not apply to criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court
101 159 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1947). The defendant was convicted of selling
an automobile above the maximum price allowed under O.P.A. regulations. The
defendant had entered into a settlement with the victims of the overpriced car, and at
trial the government elicited this testimony. The trial court allowed tins testimony
about the settlement into evidence. Ecklund, 159 F.2d at 83, 84; see tnfra notes 166169 and accompanying
text.
10
2Manko, 87 F.3d at 54-55.
103
Id. at 54 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note).
04

1 Id.
105 Brogan, 522

U.S. at 408 (holding that the language of 18 U.S.C. §

1001 permitted no exception for an "exculpatory no," and stating that "[c]ourts may not
create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how alluring the policy
arguments for doing so"). The Second Circuit addressed the Brogan holding in an
unpublished opimon that will be discussed at a later point in this note, but reached no
conclusion on the matter because they found the evidence of subsequent settlement
negotiations after a confession by the defendant harmless error. The appellant asked
the Second Circuit to overturn Manko as it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court
decision in Brogan, but the court did not consider the argument because "even if
accepted, [it] would not justify reversal of [the defendants's] conviction." United States
v. Recalde, 172 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussed infra notes 124-38 and accompanying
text).
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curbed the promotion of policies by the judiciary, leaving it to
the legislature to promote policies and laws that the justice
system will then enforce. If we as a society want to promote
putting compelling evidence of guilt ahead of encouraging
parties to compromise, the legislature, not the judiciary, should
decide that.
The question then is whether the judiciary, in
interpreting Rule 408, is exceeding its authority because of the
Rule's ambiguous language and the lack of guidance in the
committee notes and legislative history 106 To avoid any
ambiguity in the Rule's application, Congress and the advisory
committee typically draft the rules to include the forum to
which the rule applies. 10 7 Congress probably did not anticipate
ambiguity in Rule 408's application, and, as the district court
in United States v. Skeddle 0 8 stated, "Nothing in Rule 408
limits its application to civil litigation that was preceded by or
included settlement negotiations." 10 9 Whether the advisory
committee intentionally failed to address the issue of forum or
if they simply did not see the ambiguity in the language, the
fair application of this Rule favors inclusion in criminal cases.
First, according to Rule 1101(b), unless otherwise
stated, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to both cwil and
criminal proceedings. 110 In addition, the actual text of Rule 408
cites an exception to exclusion when the evidence is introduced
to "prov[e] an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution.""' This sentence would not be necessary if the
112
Rule did not apply to criminal cases.
Second, courts can also justify applying the Rule to
criminal proceedings by recogmzing the Supreme Court's
warning that the judiciary should not substitute Congress'
policies for its own. The ambiguity in the Rule's language has
106
107
108
109
110

See generally id., FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee notes.
See FED. R. Evid. 410; see supranote 100.
176 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. at 256.
See generally FED. R. EVID. 1101(b); supra note 84.

"II FED. R. EVID. 408.
112 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Diviney's Motion In Limine
to Exclude Evidence of a Civil Settlement at 7, United States v. Diviney, 99 Cr. 871
(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) ("if Rule 408 did not apply in criminal cases, there
would be no need to carve out an exception for certain circumstances in criminal
cases.") (quoting Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. at 257 (N.D. Ohio 1997)).
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forced the judicial system to rely on the advisory committee
notes, as well as the Rule's legislative history, to determine
whether Congress and the committee intended this Rule to
apply to criminal litigation.11 3 The notes following the Rule
plainly detail the public policy interest in encouraging parties
to settle and the absolute necessity of this protection to allow
parties to engage in meaningful deliberations." 4 It is obvious
from the committee notes that the Rule's drafters weighed
public policy concerns before adopting Rule 408. Yet the Second
Circuit, by citing a greater "public interest in the disclosure
and prosecution of crime,"" 5 trumps the advisory committee's
policy reasons with its own balancing of the public's interests.
Although the Manko court did discuss the policy
justifications behind Rule 408, it only addressed the public
policy interest with respect to one justification for the Rule.
Other courts and the advisory committee found other policy
reasons for this Rule." 6 Evidence of settlement and negotiation
may be irrelevant or ninumally relevant to the issue of actual
liability 117 Parties settle for any number of reasons, such as to
avoid costly litigation, avoid embarrassment, or to simply make
peace." 8 As one court framed this issue, "It does not tax the
imagination to envision the juror who retires to deliberate with
the notion that if the defendants had done nothing wrong, they
would not have paid the money back."" 9 In their treatise,
113 See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's notes; supra notes 12-24

and accompanying text.
114 Id.
115
Manko, 87 F.3d at 54 (quoting Gonzalez, 748 F.2d at 78 (citations
omitted)).
116 See United States v. Hays, 872 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussed
infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text); Ecklund v. United States, 159 F.2d 81 (6th
Cir. 1947) (discussed infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text); United States v.
Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Olo 1997) (discussed infra notes 171-97 and
accompanying text).
117 See generallyFED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's notes; Hays, 872 F.2d
at 589; Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Diviney's Motion In Liinme to
Exclude Evidence of a Civil Settlement at 7, United States v. Diviney, 99 Cr. 871
(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000).
118 See generally FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's notes; Memorandum
of Law in Support of Defendant Diviney's Motion to Set Aside the Verdict at 18, United
States v. Diviney, 99 Cr. 871 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000) (arguing that the court
erred in not allowing the defendant to cross-examine a company lawyer regarding the
lhgh cost of litigation as being the reason for a settlement).
119 Hays, 872 F.2d at 589; see also Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the
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Professors Louisell and Mueller recognize the prejudicial effect
of receiving settlement information as "such that often Rule
403 and the underlying policy of Rule 408 require exclusion
20
even when a permissible purpose can be discerned."
2. The Post-Manko Fall Out
After Manko, the Second Circuit requires a trial court to
determine the admissibility of settlements and accompanying
negotiations under a Rule 403 analysis.' 2 ' Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 allows otherwise relevant evidence to "be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice [or]
misleading the jury
"122 In so holding, the Second Circuit recognizes the potency
this evidence may have on a jury Any type of evidence, no
matter what the content, may be excluded under this Rule. A
trial judge nearly always considers whether to admit relevant
evidence in light of possible unintended adverse consequences
23
of admitting the evidence.
This issue does not arise as often as other evidentiary
considerations, but it has been a factor in at least two cases
that this Note will examine next. Both cases were decided in
the Southern District of New York. The first involved a scam to
defraud Kenny Anderson, a professional basketball player. The
second and more recent case involved a mid-level professional
who was convicted of stealing money from his company using
his position in the payroll department. These two case studies
will show how the Second Circmt's holding on this issue is
playing out on the trial level.
Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 972 (1988)
(discussing the "substantial prejudice" that can result from settlement evidence being
admitted for the jury to consider and suggesting that judges have to weigh this
prejudice when deciding on Rule 408, even if the evidence is offered for an exception to
the Rule).
120 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 43, § 170, at 272.
121 Manko, 87 F.3d at 55; see also Transcript of Pre-Trial Conference, at 15-16,
United States v. Diviney, 99 Cr. 871 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2000) (The Court: 'i
should have added this because 403 analysis is demanded by the Second Circuit in the
Manko case
I rule under Rule 403 that the relevant evidence is not outweighed by
the danger22of unfair prejudice, confusion or misleading the jury.").
1 FED. R. EVID. 403.
123 See supra note 138.
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a.

United States v. Recalde

Angel Recalde was indicted for bank fraud on January
26, 1996, by a federal grand jury sitting in the Southern
District of New York. He was tried over an eight-day period
starting September 15, 1997 He was convicted and sentenced
to a term of twenty-one months imprisonment, to be followed
by three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of $98,200.124 The evidence at trial
suggested that Recalde forged the signature of Kenny
Anderson, a professional basketball player for the New Jersey
Nets, on thirty-three checks drawn on Anderson's account.
Recalde was an employee of the Nets, doing odd jobs for
125
players and the general manager.
At trial, Recalde admitted that he signed Anderson's
name to the various checks and that he used the proceeds for
his own benefit. Recalde, however, claimed that Anderson gave
him permission to do so. 126 The scheme was uncovered when
Anderson's accountant noticed the canceled checks and asked
Anderson about them. Anderson said he knew nothing about
127
them and that his name had been forged.
Anderson's attorney, along with his accountant,
arranged a meeting with Recalde during which Anderson's
attorney placed the thirty-three checks on a table in front of
Recalde and asked Recalde if he could explain the checks.
Recalde allegedly began to cry, confessed to the crime, and
offered to give some of the more expensive items he allegedly
stole (including two cars and a large screen television) back to
Anderson and to make restitution at a rate of $500 per
month.128
Recalde subsequently hired an attorney and engaged in
settlement negotiations over a two-month period. Many
different settlement packages were discussed, although no
agreement was reached. At trial, a government witness
testified about the statements made by Recalde and the
124

Adapted from the Brief for the United States at 1-3, United States v.
Recalde, No. 98-1128 (June 2, 1998).
125 Id.
126 Id.
2

7 Id.
12-8 Id.
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subsequent settlement negotiations. The defense called several
character witnesses, including other professional basketball
players who employed Recalde at various times. Recalde also
testified, claiming that he signed Kenny Anderson's name to
the thirty-three checks and took the $98,200 as part of a
"salary" provided by Anderson for ins services. Recalde claimed
that Anderson demanded that Recalde forge Anderson's name
and pay his own salary to conceal the fact that Recalde worked
full-time for Anderson. 129
During deliberations, the jury only asked to have the
testimony about the settlement and the settlement
negotiations read back to them. Following that testimony and
evidence, the jury convicted Recalde. The defense attorney
assigned to the case only appealed one issue after tins eightday trial, that is, the admission of the settlement and
accompanying negotiations. The jury note itself is very telling.
It states, "Please read back testimony of [Anderson's attorney],
Recalde, and [Recalde's attorney] regarding restitution
discussions." 130
The district court granted the Government's in limne
motion to admit the settlement negotiations, concluding that
Rule 408 was inapplicable to criminal cases and that under
Rule 403, the relevance of the restitution evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice,
juror confusion, or waste of time. 131
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision. The defendant argued that the Second Circuit
should overrule its earlier decisions based on United States v.
Brogan13 2 because the Second Circuit reached its conclusions
on "policy grounds." 13 The Second Circuit did not address
whether Brogan overruled its prior precedents, finding that it
was at worst "harmless error" for the settlement negotiations
4
to be admitted.13
12 9

Brief for the United States at 1-3, Recalde, No. 98-1128.
130 Ct. Ex. # 6, United States v. Recalde, 96 Cr. 057 (KMW) (Sept. 23, 1997).
131 Brief for Appellant Angel Recalde at 9, United States v. Recalde, No. 98-

1128 (2d Cir. May 1, 1998).
132 522 U.S. 398 (1998); see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
133 Defendant's Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, United States
v. Recalde,
No. 98-1128 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 1998).
134
United States v. Recalde, 172 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1999).
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The attorney who defended Recalde believes that the
only reason the defendant was convicted was because the
testimony about the restitution was admitted. The defense case
suggested that the defendant was authorized to write the
checks as part of his salary Mr. Recalde's attorney believed
that because there was evidence that the defendant did have
the authority to sign other players' names, the jury would have
a difficult time convicting, except for the settlement
negotiations. 18 5 Essentially, the defendant was pumshed and
put in jail in part for trying to end the civil dispute between
himself and Kenny Anderson. He was convicted of crnnminal
charges and sent to jail for twenty-one months.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
in an unpublished opimon. 136 The court did not apply United
States v. Brogan to its analysis because the court found that
even if the policy-based rationale used in Manko was
reversible, "the evidence that [Recalde] confessed his theft and
offered to return the money when first confronted with the
forged checks, the evidence of subsequent settlement
negotiations was, at worst, harmless error."137 This conclusion
was reached despite the fact that the jury, during
deliberations, asked only for the settlement testimony, and the
prosecutor emphasized the fact that Recalde had attempted to
settle his claim repeatedly during summation and rebuttal. 83
b.

United States v. Dwzney

Earl Diviney was indicted by a grand jury sitting in the
Southern District of New York for conspiracy to make forged
securities and the substantive offense of forging securities for
the company that he worked for. On April 12, 2000, following a
five-day jury trial, Diviney was convicted of both counts. The
evidence at trial showed that there was a conspiracy to steal
money from a mid-sized company The participants wrote
135 Interview, with Robert Baum, Esq., The Legal Aid Society, Federal
Defender Division (Jan. 18, 2002).
136 172 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1999).
137 Td.

138 Brief for Appellant Angel Recalde at 12-14, Recalde, No. 98-1128 (2d Cir.
May 1, 1998).
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payroll adjustment checks when no money was owed to the
employee. The payroll system allowed for extra checks to be
written when an employee had been shortchanged. Diviney
was the payroll manager and allegedly the ring leader of the
conspiracy to steal from the company 139
The defendant left the company to work for Smith
Barney in New York, but continued to perform some tax work
for the company when the payroll adjustment scheme was
discovered. When the company approached other individuals
involved in the conspiracy, they accused Diviney of being
involved as well. 140 Diviney denied the allegations at first, but
when the company's attorney claimed that over $100,000 had
been stolen, the defendant allegedly claimed "there was no
[expletive] way, that it wasn't that much money, that he only
got certain amounts."'' The defendant would not sign any
papers admitting to his role in the scam, but did retain a law
firm to engage in settlement negotiations. Diviney agreed to
pay the company $60,000, in exchange for a general release
from the company 142 The agreement also provided that
Diviney's payment "does not constitute an admission of any
liability
but rather is being made for the sole purpose of
resolving all outstanding disputes between the parties
143
without the need for engaging in costly litigation."'
When the district court denied the defendant's request
to suppress the evidence of the settlement and accompanying
negotiations, the judge stated,
I rule that Rule 408 is by its terms focused on civil liability, and even
though the Federal Rules of Evidence, as [the defense attorney]
argued in his brief, is intended to cover both civil and crnnminal cases,
the wording of Rule 408
to the criminal law has to be a very
narrow one. 144
139 Facts adapted from Governmenes Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
the Post-Trial Motion of Defendant Earl Diviney at 5-8, United States v. Diviney, 99
Cr. 871 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2000).
140 Id. at 13.
141 Id. at 14 (quoting Trial Transcript at 489, United States v. Diviney, 99 Cr.
871 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2000).
142 Id.
143 Government Exhibit 26, at 1, United States v. Diviney, 99 Cr. 871 (AKH)
(Govt. Ex. 26 is a copy of the settlement agreement entered into by the defendant and
his former employer).
144 Transcript of Pre-Trial Conference at 14, United States v. Divuiey, 99 Cr.
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The judge later followed Manko by conducting a Rule 403
analysis and found that the proffered evidence was highly
probative and not outweighed by the dangers of unfair
prejudice, confusion, or potential to ,mslead the jury 145
The defendant did not appeal the judge's ruling and
served more than a year in jail for his crimes. During this trial
there was evidence from cooperators who alleged the
defendant's involvement in the scheme, along with evidence of
irregular cash deposits into the defendant's bank account. But
without question, the most convincing evidence was the
testimony from the company's lawyer about the settlement
agreement and the settlement itself. The defendant's attorney
tried to point out that civil litigation would have been much
more expensive then just settling with the company Another
reason proposed by the defendant for settling was the fact that
he had started working for a new company and did not want to
deal with any accusations from his former employer. However,
the jury did not accept these explanations, either because they
did not believe them or because they were not informed of the
expenses of civil litigation, and the defendant was convicted.
III.

COURTS OUTSIDE THE SECOND CIRCUIT ADDRESSING
RULE 408'S APPLICATION TO CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES

Although the case law on this issue is relatively
sparse, 146 other courts outside the Second Circuit have
addressed Rule 408's application to criminal and civil cases. 147
An often cited case is United States v. Hays,1' but other courts
have addressed the applicability of Rule 408 to criminal cases.
871 (AKH)4 5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2000).
1 Id. at 15, 16 (the court, in making this determination, found that "if
someone is confronted with a statement that you stole $60,000 and says it wasn't that
much, that indicates a crunminal state of mind admitting stealing. If someone pays back
$60,000 [which the defendant had previously done after the settlement] when charged
with having stolen $60,000, there is an argument that, well, I did it because I didn't
want litigation, I was going on to another job, I was doing something else, I was
making a lot of money, and so on, but I think ies for the jury to understand.").
146 Manko, 87 F.3d at 54.
147 See generally United States v. Hays, 872 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Meadows, 598 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Skeddle, 176
F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
148 872 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1989).
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This section of the Note will examine the reasoning various
courts have used in determining whether Rule 408 should
apply to civil and crminal proceedings.
A.

United States v. Prewitt

In United States v. Prewttt,149 the Seventh Circuit
summarily agreed with the Second Circuit that the protections
afforded under Rule 408 only apply to civil proceedings. The
defendants in Prewtt were convicted of mail fraud arising out
of sham security deals. At trial, an investigator for the state of
Indiana testified about statements made during settlement
negotiations where one of the defendants admitted that a
number of the checks at issue in the case were for the
150
defendant's own benefit.
The Prewitt court found that the "clear" interpretation
of Rule 408 suggested that it should apply only to civil
proceedings. 151 Following this statement, the court quoted from
both the Gonzalez and the Baker decisions in holding that,
from a policy standpoint, the "public interest in the prosecution
of crime is greater than the public interest in the settlement of
52
civil disputes." 1
B.

United States v. Meadows

In United States v. Meadows, the Fifth Circuit
addressed the applicability of Rule 408 to criminal
prosecutions. 153 In a criminal case tried in the Northern
District of Georgia, the defendant was convicted of fraudulently
receiving funds which were the subject of a grant pursuant to
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. At trial, the
government introduced statements made by the defendant to a
government official when he was confronted with the alleged

149 34 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1994).
150 Id. at 438.

151 Id. at 439. The court was specifically alluding to the language m the Rule
concerning validity and amount of a claim.
152 Id.
153 598 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1979).

2001]

CIVIL SETTLEMENTS AS EVIDENCE

fraud. On cross-examination, the defense counsel elicited
testimony that the defendant had agreed to a repayment
schedule. 154
Two separate factual issues in this case implicated Rule
408. The first was the defendant's alleged admission of guilt
when he was confronted with his involvement in the fraud
scheme. On this issue, the court found that this admission was
not in the course of any settlement negotiations and that it was
an admission by the defendant. The second fact and issue was
the actual repayment of the money The court concluded that
the repayment was a settlement and as such was governed by
Rule 408.155 Furthermore, because the defense counsel had
elicited testimony about the settlement the court held that it
was a "calculated, tactical defense decision,"156 and therefore
could not be called unduly prejudicial.
The court seemed to suggest that instead of a brightline rule of exclusion, Rule 408 gives a party a privilege that
can be waived. 157 The court first stated that the settlement was
governed by Rule 408, even though the forum was crminal. 158
At this point the court could have held the evidence
inadmissible under Rule 408, since the Rule plainly states that
evidence of a settlement is not admissible.1 59 But the court
allowed the evidence to be admitted because the defendant's
counsel elicited the testimony Thus, the court allowed
evidence of a settlement to be both a shield and a sword for the
defendant, in that the prosecution was not allowed to admit
settlement evidence, but the defendant, if so inclined, was
allowed to elicit the testimony
C.

United States v. Hays

In the midst of the savings and loan crisis of the mid1980s, the Fifth Circuit once again addressed the applicability
164 Id. at 986, 989.
15 5
id. at 989.
156 Id.
157 See generally WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE

§

408.02[4][a],

at

9. Weinstein says it makes sense to treat Rule 408 as a privilege, but notes that the
Rule itself reads as if it were an absolute exclusion.
158 Meadows, 598 F.2d at 989.
159 FED. R. EVID. 408.
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of Rule 408 to crimial proceedings. In United States v.
Hays,160 the defendants were convicted of fraudulent loan
dealings and with misapplication of funds belonging to a
savings and loan. At trial the government introduced into
evidence, among other things, both a settlement entered into
by the defendants and testimony from civil depositions in
which the defendants discussed the settlement. The
government wanted to use the evidence to assist the jury in
understanding "the breadth of the conspiracy" 16 1 The Fifth
Circuit soundly rejected this reasoning, stating that "this
purpose stands at direct odds with the clear mandates of Rule
408."162
The Fifth Circuit applied Rule 408 to this criminal case
without any justification, stating that the situation at bar was
"clearly contemplated" by the framers of Rule 4 0 8 .163 The Hays
court recognized that the potential impact of settlement
evidence is profound. 164 The court applied a realist approach,
envisioning the prejudice undoubtedly faced by a defendant
whose jury has heard he settled a civil case the underlying
16 5
charges of the instant criminal case.
This decision is interesting because of the direct and
swift way the court applied Rule 408 to criminal proceedings.
The court dismissed the government's contention that this
evidence will assist the jury in understanding how the
conspiracy worked. The court recognized the overwhelming
prejudicial effect a civil settlement would have on a jury
of
deciding criminal charges arising out of the same set 166
circumstances. However, this case is analogous to Gonzalez
in that the court did not go into a lengthy discussion or
analysis of the policy of Rule 408. Rather, the court simply
applied the Federal Rules of Evidence and found that nothing
within Rule 408 limited the Rule's application to the criminal
docket.

160 872 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1989).
16 1 Id. at 589.

162 Id.
63

1

Id.

164 Id.
165 Hays, 872 F.2d at 589.
166 United States v. Gonzalez, 748 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1984).
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D.

United States v. Ecklund

As noted in Section I.C of this Note, the Manko court
specifically declined to follow a 1947, pre-Rule 408 decision
167
handed down by the Sixth Circuit, Ecklund v. United States.
While the precedential value of Ecklund is negligible, the
opinion does give interesting policy reasons for settlements
which pre-date Rule 408's enactment. Surely, the questions
raised and answered in this opinion are still at issue today,
despite and because of Rule 408. The court found it well-settled
that "evidence of an effort to compromise is inadmissible in a
civil case." 168 The Sixth Circuit then questioned why this
evidence should be admitted in a criminal case "where the
essential ingredients of [civil] liability are wholly at
69
vanance"1
The Ecklund court reversed and remanded the decision
because the court found that by receiving settlement evidence,
the jury was under the impression that the settlement by the
defendant of his civil liability was evidence that he is guilty of
the charges returned by a grand jury 7 0 Similar to the Hays
decision, the court took a realist approach by questioning the
practical effect this evidence might have on a jury when they
deliberate.
E.

United States v. Skeddle

One of the most detailed decisions on Rule 408's
limitations does not come from a circuit court decision, but
from a district court judge ruling on a motion i limme to
exclude statements made to a corporation and to a firm hired
by the corporation to investigate allegations of fraud within the
company This case is not binding on any court, but it is by far
the most detailed opinion directly on the issue. As discussed
throughout this Note, other opinions do not give detailed
explanations on the numerous issues involved in the
167 159 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1947).
168
Id. at 84.
169

Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 85.

170 See
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applicability of Rule 408 to criminal proceedings.' 7 ' The judge
in United States v. Skeddle 7 2 accepted the defendants'
arguments that they had submitted to questioing by the
corporation's investigators because they were making an effort
to settle the dispute. The defendants claimed that if they had
known that notes from the investigation would end up in the
government's hands, they would never have consented to an

interview

173

The judge read Rule 408 literally and found that
"[n]othmg in Rule 408 limits its application to civil litigation
" and therefore held the statements inadmissible. 174 The
Skeddle opimon found Rule 1101(b) binding on the court. 75
"Looking only at the text of Rule 408 in the context required by
Rule 1101(b) leads to the conclusion that exclusion of the
defendants' statements is required." 176 In addition, the court, in
a footnote, addressed the distinction between direct evidence of
a settlement and evidence of statements made during
negotiations, but found that neither the Rule nor case law
treats evidence of a settlement or evidence of settlement
negotiations differently 177
The court then took issue with contrary holdings.
Addressing the Manko case first, the court disagreed with the
proposition that, since the policy underlying Rule 408 does not
apply to criminal prosecutions, then the Rule itself does not
apply to criminal proceedings. 178 The court held that "just
because the policy of encouraging settlements may be
171 See generally Manko v. United States, 87 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Baker, 926 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Gonzalez, 748 F.2d 74
(2d Cir. 1984).
172 176 F.R.D. at 255.
173 Id. at 256.
174 Id.

175 Id. See supra note 84.

176 Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. at 256.
177 Id. at 256 n.3. Treating settlements and settlement negotiations the same
makes sense. They are, essentially, a distinction without a difference because both are
protected by the Rule and attempting to distinguish by allowing one or the other into
evidence would render the Rule worthless. A defendant gains little if the prosecution is
allowed to introduce negotiations where concessions may have been made but not
allowed to introduce the settlement itself. Conversely, introducing a settlement

agreement gives the prosecution an advantage that the Rule does not allow because
the jury knows the defendant settled the claims civilly even if they hear no testimony
about the negotiations, so the damage is done to the defendant.
178 Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. at 256-57.
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irrelevant in a criminal prosecution does not mean that
settlement statements derived from a civil context suddenly
lose the protection by Rule 408 when the forum changes to a
criminal context."'7 9 Later in the opinon, the court addressed
the forum issue once again: "In determining exclusion under
Rule 408, attention must be directed to the context in which
the statements are made, not the context in which the
180
statements are sought to be admitted."
The Skeddle opinion also addressed other opinions
exclude
Rule 408 from criminal trials, but distinguished
which
the case at bar because the statements were made to a prwate
investigator, rather than to a government official. 18 ' The court
found that Rule 410 is narrower than Rule 408, in that Rule
410 excludes only statements made to a government attorney
in the course of plea discussions, not admissions to any
government agent or official.18 2 Rule 408, on the other hand,
excludes any statement made during a settlement negotiation,
18
no matter to whom the statement is made.
Further, the court addressed the plain language of the
Rule and agreed that if "Rule 408 did not apply in crimial
cases, there would be no need to carve out an exception for
certain circumstances in criminal cases."' 8 4 The court credited
the drafters of the FederalRules of Evidence for knowing that
the rules they enact will apply generally to both civil and
criminal cases, and noted that "[flailure to limit Rule 408 to
civil litigation"8 5 specifically shows the drafters' intention that
the Rule apply jointly to civil and criminal litigation.
Many evidence treatises have addressed the policy
issues and complexities of Rule 408. Virtually all find that Rule
408 should apply equally to both civil and criminal cases.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 257; see supranotes 30-35 and accompanying text.

181 The court is specifically addressing United States v. Prewitt, 34 F.3d 436
(7th Cir. 1994) (discussed supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text), and United
States v. Baker, 926 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussed supra notes 79-97 and
accompanying text).
182 Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. at 257.
183 Id.
184 Id. The court is referring to the last sentence of Rule 408, discussed supra

notes 42-43, which states that "[t]his rule also does not require exclusion when the
proving an effort to obstruct a
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as
criminal investigation or prosecution." FED. R. EVID. 408.

185 Skeddle, 176 F.R.D. at 257.
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Mueller and Kirkpatrick's treatise highlights modern society's
tendency to favor private settlement of disputes, even in the
criminal forum. 186 "The modern philosophy is somewhat more
favorably disposed to such private arrangements," they argue,
"at least in connection with relatively minor property
offenses." 187 The treatise gives examples of some jurisdictions
that have given statutory authority to parties to settle
misdemeanor crnmes. 188 This treatise takes specific issue with
the precedential Second Circuit decision Untted States v.
Gonzalez:189
The Gonzalez decision is truly unfortunate, and it will make it very
hard for victims of crime to reach a settlement of civil claims against
the perpetrator whenever there is any appreciable risk of
prosecution. The decision cannot help but chill negotiations m this
context. Gonzalez runs against the gram of the modern trend of

encouraging settlement between perpetrator and victin, which often
190
produces better results than criminal sanction.

Another leading evidence treatise' 91 also questions the
accuracy of Gonzalez in holding that society has a greater
interest "in the disclosure and prosecution of crime" than "in
the settlement of civil disputes." 9 2 The treatise author, David
P Leonard, discusses a South Carolina decision 93 in which the
court admitted evidence that the defendant had told another
194
individual that he would pay in order to end the legal battle.
According to Leonard, this decision and others like it assume
that society is not concerned with compensating victims of
crime and also ignore "the reality that society requires the
settlement of criminal cases and that virtually all such matters
are compromised by plea bargain and without the necessity of
18

§ 138.
Id. § 138, at 104.
188 Id. The treatise cites an Oregon statute that authorizes private settlement
of certain misdemeanors. In light of this, it makes sense that "[w]hen a person settles a
claim in compliance with applicable state law,
the settlement (and accompanying
conduct and statements) should be excludable under [Rule] 408." Id. § 138, n. 16.
189 748 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1984).
19 0
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICI, supra note 43, § 138 n. 17 (2d ed. 1994).
6MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supranote 43,

187

191 LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, SELECTED
RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 3.7.3 (2000 Supp.).

192 Gonzalez, 748 F.2d at 78.
193 State v. Wideman, 46 S.E. 769 (S.C. 1904).
19 4 Id. at 770.
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formal trial."1 95 A Rule that finds compromise evidence
admissible in criminal cases "adopts the position that all such
cases are alike and that there are no situations in which the
interests of society or the victim (or both) are served by
encouraging
compromise efforts." 196 Leonard's treatise
recogmzes the confusion in the language of Rule 408 and finds
that the drafters probably did not consider this issue when
197
developing this Rule.
CONCLUSION

The Second Circuit has gone further than any other
court to explain its reasoning in limitmg Rule 408 to civil
proceedings. The Second Circuit places a high value on the
goals of the criminal justice system and is willing to sacrifice
the possible added expenses and strain that increased
litigation might impose if parties shy away from settling
because of fear of future implications in the crimial arena.
This reasoning may reflect the will of Congress more than
commentators recogmze. However, even if the end result is
correct, the means by which the Second Circuit has arrived at
this conclusion is flawed. Indeed, other courts and many
commentators have criticized these decisions for violating the
rule's text and proper application.
The courts should not make up for Congress' possible
oversights and mistakes by invoking their own interpretation
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 408 has been in
existence for almost three decades. As it is written now,
nothing limits Rule 408 to civil litigation. A party should not be
protected by this Rule while engaging in civil litigation with a
private party, only to have the veil lifted when the forum
changes to criminal. If the Rule should apply only to civil cases,
then Congress and the advisory committee should amend the
Rule to reflect that.
The argument put forth by the Second Circuit that
public policy in criminal cases is greater than judicial policies
of encouraging parties to settle is compelling because in many
195 LEONARD, supra note 191, § 3.7.3, 3:91.
196 Id. § 3.7.3., at 3:91-92.

197 Id. § 3.7.3., at 3:96.
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of the cases that this Note examined one is not left with the
sense that the defendant was wrongly convicted. For the
judicial system to compel Congress and the advisory committee
to settle Rule 408's applicability, often a moral, rather than
procedural, injustice must occur. Society does not feel sorry for
Angel Recalde or Earl Diviney because it believes they are
guilty because they settled their claims and willingly gave
thousands of dollars to their accusers. But this is exactly the
point. Even if they were guilty of defrauding their employers,
they attempted to settle their disagreements. Society and the
judicial system must do everything possible to encourage
parties to settle, and this procedural guarantee of protection,
lifted in the criminal arena, is nothing more than a trap for the
unwary party that is willing to compromise. The tough
negotiator who admits nothing benefits; the party that settles
and negotiates disputes pays the price of having his admissions
used against him when the forum changes to criminal. If the
judicial system, Congress, and the advisory committee do
conclude that despite the potential costs to the system, this
compelling evidence of guilt should be presented to the jury, at
the very least the Rule itself should state this.
This issue does not arise often, which is perhaps why
the outcry to resolve the ambiguity is not louder. But as
evidenced in the case studies of United States v. Recalde and

United States v. Dwiney, this interpretation may be the
difference between a defendant being convicted or acquitted. A
practicing attorney in the Second Circuit is ill-advised to
recommend settlement of civil litigation if the client's actions
could give rise to a criminal proceeding. For litigators,
unchartered waters come with the territory, but an attorney
should not have to choose between advising a client to engage
in settlement negotiations and the potential criminal
implications that may come as a result of the negotiations. The
clear voice from Congress and the judicial system is that the
system cannot function without settlements occurring in the
majority of both civil and criminal cases. Parties must,
therefore, know what they are giving up when they engage in
settlement negotiations. If society and the judicial system
believe that settlement evidence should be admitted, then at
the very least, attorneys and their clients should be informed
so that they can act under proper advice and caution. Whether
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the Second Circuit has correctly or incorrectly interpreted Rule
408 is not as important as having a consistent interpretation
from Congress.

Todd W. Blanchet

t Brooklyn Law School, J.D. Candidate, June 2004.

